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Mr  Chairman, 
Ladies  and  gentlemen, 
1.  Introduction 
It is a  great  privilege  for  me  to  be  invited  to  address  you 
on  the  problems  of  the  shipbuilding  industry.  I  regard  this as  a 
sign of your interest in  the  European  cause.  In  particular, it affnrds 
me  the opportunity to give  this audience  drawn  primarily from  the 
shipping world an account  of  the approach  the  European  Commission 
feels  should  be adopted  to steer the  shipbuildin~ industry· through 
the present crisis. 
·2.  Shipbuilding in  the vortex of structural  change 
Things are not  too  good  in_the shipbuilding industry,  as  you 
know. 
Although  the level of production world-wide is still fairly high, 
employment  in  this sector is declining sharply.  The  well-filled 
order-bo.oks  of nineteen-seventy-two  and  seventy-three are getting 
alarmingly empty,  and  new  orders  in nineteen-seventy-seven·amounted 
to  no  more  than half of capacity. 
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A number. of firms in Europe,  and still more  in Japan,  have  been 
finding themselves in difficulties.  And  in the years ahead this is going 
t~ happen more  and  more. 
But  it is not  only the  shipbuilding industry that is in trouble. 
Other  sectors too are  up  against  serious problems,  the  shipping sector 
among  them.  All of them  are  suffering from  the effects of inflation, 
recession and balance-of-payments difficulties,  coupled  with monetary 
disarray.  At  the  same  time,  these problems are  indissociably linked 
with the  structural  changes in progress in the  industrial~zed countries, 
and  in particular in Europe. 
I  would  list three ~actors: 
(i) higher production costs,  in consequence  more  especially of 
higher energy,  raw-materials and  labour costs; 
(ii) the  changing nature of demand,  to do  partly hith the  increased 
attention being paid to environmental  conservation and to more 
rational use  of energy and  raw materials; 
(iii) the  emergence  of new  countries as t·rading partners,  and  in some 
cases as formidable  competitors. 
These  changes are making it necessary to effect major adjustments 
in Europe's industry: 
(a)  the  structures of industry.need to be better tailored to the new 
market  requiremepts; 
(b)  a  structural policy 1dll ba.ve  to be  framed to promote  new  industrial 
activities in place of those no  longer viable; 
\ 
(c)  . an active  commercial policy •·:ill be  needed to underpin this structural 
policy.  It must  not  be  a  protectionist  one,  for that  woul~ involve 
dire dangers for the Community,  as the biggest trading bloc in the 
world,  but it could  suitably include a  number  of defensive measures 
to prevent distortions and over-rapid  changes  in the  industrial patt 
I  need  only ment'ion the measures taken vli  th respect  to steel and te 
imports. 
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The  shipbuilding industry is something  f  . 
o  a  spcc1al  car.o  ir.  tt- 1 ~ 
connection,  inasmuch as the conventional weapons  f  . 
o  Collli:lercu~::.  po l1-:- ~,. 
are here  of little or no effect.  To  impose  import  duties on  shipr.;  c:-
to our  shiptuilde~~  prohibit their import  would merely be. an incentive 
to register even more  vessels under  cheaper flags. 
So  in tackling the problem  of the  shipbuilding sector the  focus 
must  be  on  the adjustment  of structures and of capacity.  But  since 
the  shipbuilding problem is a  world-vride  one,  and  moreover  indissociable 
from  the  shipping side,  any  strategy for dealing l-vith  it must  also 
relate to international cooperation and to shipping policy. 
A further point is that developments  in the  shipbuilding sector 
are proceeding at. such a  pace that there is not  the time  to \vai t  for a 
comprehensive  structural polio~.  It is vital that  Community  action 
here  should be mounted  right  aw~y. 
3·  Co~~unitv action 
Why  should there be  a  Community  reconstruction plan? 
(i)  Hell,  firstly,  the industry,  and the national authorities,  tend 
too much  to concentrate  on  coping with  short-term difficulties,  and  do 
not  usually bother their heads \'lith the fact  that the crisis ought  to 
be  used to make  the industry competitive again.  They  reckon that aid 
making it easier to obtain orders will  serve  .. to keep  the  impact  of 
the crisis to a  minimum.  This-is a  grave  and  costly mistake. 
In a  market  where  sales in the next  five years \.fill be  not much 
more  than half l-lhat  the  industry can produce,  not  everybody  can hope 
to capture the lion's share,  particularly .vrhen  much  of our  shipbuilding 
industry is less competitive than its rivals, notably Japan and a 
number  of nev:comers  such as South Korea,  Taiwan and  others. 
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If our industry chooses nevertheless to pin its faith to Government 
support,  it should be borne in mind  that those rivals can wield the  same 
weapon,  and perhaps even stronger ones. 
(ii) ·Secondly,  the Treaty of Rome  requires the Commission  not to let 
national aid give rise to distortions in competition.  Now  this is an 
. impossible task vdthout  a  coherent  picture of vlhat  is to be  done  about 
the  shipbuilding industry in the  Community.  The  Commission  fully 
realizes that aid is necessary,  but  in its viev1  aid can only be  permitted 
if calculated to serve  the  interests of the  Community  shipbuilding 
industry as a  uhole.  That  this is essential is the more  apparent  >Jhen 
we  consider the gigantic scale of the financial  support  extended to the 
shipbuilding industry in the rolember  States.  In nineteen-seventy-six, 
so  f~r as can  be  computed,  it amounted,  paid direct  or via the  shipowners 
to  something like six hundred million units of account.  I  do  not  think 
it can very well be  claimed that the free-market  principle  can perform 
its selective function in this sector.  With  such  a  measure  of Government 
intervention there ~  be  coordination if one  Member  State's policy is 
not to clash with or altogether ruin another's. 
Furthermore it must  be  remembered  that not  one  r.rember  State,  for 
all its efforts, has managed  to shield its industry from  the  crisis. 
Once  ends and means  were  geared to one  another within a  broader framev:ork, 
the industry would  be better able to stand up  to the crisis. 
(iii) Anithirdly,  the fact  is i.?escapable that no Member  State  en  its o'-m 
can get  ~apan to scale her capacity dovm  to a  more  realistic level.  Only 
if the. Community  can  speak \·lith  one  voice  i·s there the faintest  chance  of 
doi.ng  so.  l3ut  then it too lvould  have  to pledge itself to bear its share 
of the crisis. -5-
4•  Strategy 
The  Commission is well aware  that there are great differences betl'7een 
l>lember  State and  Member  State,  and  that there would  be no.  sense in trying 
to institute a  single  standard  shipbuilding policy.for the whole  Community. 
What  it does want  is that the  several national facilities and  instruments 
should be  so used as to mesh  into a  Community  strategy,  aimed  at  cutting 
· back capacity,  improving our yards'  productivity and  creating alternative 
employment  for workers thereby rendered redundant,  and to some  extent 
influencing demand,  and  at international cooperation.  No  ready-made 
prescriptions there,  unless that  each problem needs to be  tackled according 
as,  how  and  when  it arises. 
The  Commission  plans to pursue  in this sector a  policy of consultation 
and  cooperation  i~volving all those  concerned- the authorities of course, 
but also the  industry,  the unions and  the  shipo~ners. 
5·  Adjustment  of capacity and  structures 
The  most  important  feature  of the Commission's projected strategy 
is the adjustment  of the  Community  shipbuilding industry's production 
capacity and  structures  • 
. .  .  .  ·  .. 
The  industry's troubles are due  to t'l<ro  things: first, the  steep 
drop  since the oil crisis in demand  for,  in particular,  large tankers 
and bulk carriers, -v:hich  is not  expected to pick up  again until the 
mid-eighties,  plus  such mass.ive  capacity that a  glut would  have  developed 
even if there had been no  econ~mic crisis; and  secondly,  the fact that 
our industry is less  c~mpetitive than Japan's and those .of the other new 
producer countries I  mentioned  just now  - and not  only by  reason of abnormal 
prices or factors outside its control. 
"And  so the  focus  in reconstruction must  be  on  tailoring production 
capacity to market  prospects and  on  making  our yards more  competitive. 
....-- 6 
., 
Tailoring capacity to market prospects is necessary because  so 
severe and long-lasting a  crisis has structural implications.  Even 
if demand  does revive  early in the next  decade,  we  can hardly expect 
the European  shipbuilding industry to be the first to reap the benefits 
given its high production  costs.  What  is more  it must  be borne  in mind 
that the shipbuilding countries other than Europe  and  Japan are making 
a  tremendous push for the market,  by means  inter alia of low  labour costs, 
subsidies, protectionist policies and/or non-commercial prices. 
Preserving existing Community  capacity thus means  putting off the 
problem  of actual reconstruction,  l-:hich  only makes  it even hards::·  to 
solve.  Government  financial aid l'lhich is having to be provided more 
and more  to keep the  surplus capacity going cannot  be  forthcoming to 
improve the  capacity that  ought  to be maintained.  The  orders going 
to the  superfluous yards are lost to the most  promising ones,  so  that 
they too are unable to operate  under  optimum  conditions. 
And  again,  preserving too much  capacity encourages  speculative 
orders,  attracted by the artificially low  prices.  These  orders increase 
the overcapacity of the fleet  and  in their turn further prolong the 
shipbuilding crisis. 
:1\Ierely  putting surplus capacity on  ice is not  enough,  for vlith 
every upturn in the market  that  capacity  i~. reactivated and  ir;,pedes 
a11y  real improvement  in the  sit.uation.  The  Commission  is of the  opinion 
that,acceptance of capacity cutbacks cannot  be left purely to the  operation 
of market  forces,  cannot  be  taken for granted as  something that is bound 
to happen anyway. I 
! 
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A reconstruction yielding a  healthier industry cannot  just be  awaited, 
it has got to be  organized.  A general  sauve-qui~peut would mean  disorderly 
contraction anq  could involve yards which  thoroughly deserve,  on  economic, 
social and regional grounds, to continue in operation. 
6.  The  quantitative indicator 
Accordingly,  the  Commission  has  submitted a  proposal to the Council 
of Ministers for the  establishment  of a  quantitative indicator for the 
production capacity considered desirable.  This is purely a  crisis 
instrument,  and  intended moreover to be  updated  from  time to time in 
line l-Tith  developments. 
The  level it would  be  fixed at  \'lould  be  determined in consultation 
with the authorities and  the industry,  on  the one  hand  reflecting the 
resolve of the  Community  to preserve  a  capacity commensurate  ldth the 
major importance to it of external trade,  and  on  the other bearing 
some  relation to the market  outlook for our industry,  which  we  have 
provisionally estimated at rather over half the production of nineteen-
seventy-five. 
The  indicator "1-muld  not  be  binding: ·for the industry,  with  .\~-hich 
responsibility for effecting its reconstruction l'I'OUld  primarily rest, 
it would  be  in the nature of a  guideline.  But  its function viOuld  be 
first and  foremost  to serve as a  point  of departure for the policy of 
the Member  States and  of the  Community. 
I  ---------- . .. . .  ... 
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7•  Social measures 
:;:;•  The  alignment  of capacity on  this indicator will be  seriously 
complicated by social considerations.  The  Netherlands,  v1here  a  plan for 
the  shipbuilding industry has been dra1-m  up,  is Hitness of this.  So  it 
is vital that the process should be  accompanied  by  supporting social 
measures and the  creation of alternative employment.  Accordingly the 
Commission  has proposed that the  Community  should  contribute through 
its Social Fund,  its Regional Fund  and  other monies  specially allotted 
or to be  allotted to it by the  Council. 
8.  Improvement  of production structures 
Though  the pruning of capacity is essential if the  industry is 
to be made  more  competitive,  it does not  per  se  improve  productivity. 
To  do that there will need to c<?  modernization of enterprise structures, 
care being taken,  hovlever,  to ensure that this does not  cause total 
CommUnity  capacity to exceed the desired level.  Rer:.awal  of plant  Hill 
of course  be  involved,  but  perhaps even more  important  Nill be moves 
towards better production methods,  better industrial relations,  better 
management,  automation·,  inter-yard cooperation,  standardization,  and  so 
on,  and also more  concentration on  research and  development.  Only  by 
higher productivity and  the  successful marketing of neH  high-quality 
products can  our industry offset  its higher production costs and  secure 
its rightful place in the market. 
Here too responsibility.  res·~s primarily \·dth the  firms themselves. 
Intminy cases it will only by possible to  c~rry ~he measures  concerned 
into effe.ct if they can  count  on  financial aid from  the public purse, 
but .nati~nal....;level aid must  be  consonant  with the Fourth Directive on 
ship  building aid now  a<:ai t ing the  Council'  .s  approval,  \-J"hi ch  provides 
that  such aid must  not  be  such as to make  for an overall increase in 
capacity. I 
I 
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9·  Influencing demand 
The  second facet  of the  Commission's proposed strategy is action 
with respect to demand.  Not  protectionist action,  I  hasten  to say, 
nor,  I  would  add,  is there any idea of making the  shipo\'mers get  the 
shipbuilders out  of their troubles by  compelling them  to place orders. 
All the  same,  I  would  point  out that the  shipowners'  and  the  shipbuilders' 
interesware,  in the  long term,  parallel.  After all, it is very much  to 
the  shipbuilders'  interest that the  shipowners  should be  competitive  and 
prosperous.  A prosperous  shipovmer is a  potential customer.  Our  shipyards 
can  supply him  provided he  is competitive. 
Even  though the  Conun1mity  accounts for one-third of \vorld trade, 
it is a  fact  that its merchant  torillage  has  shrunk from  twenty-nine 
percent  of the \'Torld  total in nineteen-sixty five to nineteen ·percent 
in nineteen-seventy-seven,  mainly in consequence  of the  sudden  advent 
of the  cheap  flag countries. 
To  face  up  to theredevelopments and  give  Community  shipo,mers a· 
better chance  in the  sea transport market,  it is important to act more 
vigorously against the various forms  of unfair  competi~ion - against 
·vessels that do  not  meet  international safety standards or  comply  v~ith 
minimum  requirements as to working conditions,  to  say nothing of the 
systematic undercutting of freight rates by the fleets of the State-
trading countries.  The  Community  should give  a  push to international 
moves  in this direction,  or if these do  not.produce reiults should move 
itself. 
-- ~-~..:.-" 10. International action · 
·,'{, ..  ·~··· 
- 10-
The  third facet  of the  strategy the Commission  is advoc;...ting 
is international action. 
The  crisis being \vorld-wide,  obviously it cannot  be  dealt Hith 
by the Community  alone:  international cooperation is indispensable. 
This has been recog.11ized  at OECD  in the General Guidelines for l·1ember 
States' Policy on  Shipbuilding of May  nineteen-seventy-six adopted by 
the vlestern European  countries and Japan,  '·rhich  aclrno'l-:ledge  the need 
to adjust production capacity to market  prospects.  This-statement  of 
principle has,  hOi·iever,  not yet  been translated into more  concrete 
agreements. 
Admittedly talks with Japan,  under pressure from  the  Community 
and elseH·here,  have  resulted .in Japan's undertaking to monitor the 
prices of the  ships she  exp0rts more  strictly and to slap on  a  five 
percent  increase,  and  in her expressing uillingness to observe  some 
measure  of voluntary restraint as to exports,  but the effect  of these 
steps must  be regarded as very limited.  If the distribution of orders 
beh1een Japan and \1estern Europe  for nineteen-seventy-seven works  out 
better than for nineteen-seventy-six,  that is largely due  to national 
aid and the movements  of the yen. 
It is no  good  thinking international  cooperation on its ovm  \:ill 
produce  a  permanently better distribution'of orders.  The  Community  can 
only consolidate its position· in the vmrld marke-t;  in that respect by 
'
11  action· to make  itself. more  competitive. 
As  regards adjusting  capa~ity to the state of the market,  OECD 
cooperation presents a  rather more  favourable picture.  Japan has 
issued a  reco~~endation to her forty-five biggest yards to cut  back 
their activity to an average  seventy percent.  That,  though,  only 
means  putting capacity on  ice, not  actually reducing it:  there are 
those in the Japanese  industry r1ho  are calling for a  still lower rate 
of utilization,  and even the \-:ord  closure is no  longer taboo.  In S·v:eden 1- ~- -~--~- ~  --. 
- 11  - '. 
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a  reduction in capacity has been enacted by  law,  but  nor1  a  commission 
has been  set  up  to consider Hhcther further pruning is necessary;  in 
Norway too a  State commission has  concluded that  substantial cuts in 
capacity are needed. 
Obviously,  the  Community  cannot  demand  of its partners that they 
make  capacity cutbacks if it is not  prepared to do  its own  part.  Japan 
will be the more  disinclined to scrap sufficient of her capacity so  long 
as she feels  sure her industry has a  competitive edge  over Europe's. 
11.  Conclusion 
ley  first  conclusion from  this state of affairs is that there is 
no  way  out  for the shipbuilding industry as long as the industry and 
the authorities in each country think they can  cope  on  their otvn  and 
their competitors can  carry the baby. 
\ihat  is needed is solidarity - first and  foremost  Community 
solidarity, perhaps embodied  in a  Community-agreed  strategy,  and  alFo 
international solidarity. 
And  my  fin~l conclusion is that the crucial problem in adjusting 
capacity and making  our shipbuilding industry more  competitive is the 
need to create alternative employment.  If we  do  not  succeed in this, 
and the orderly restructuring of the  sector is thereby doomed  to failure, 
the  shipbuilding industry t'lill. suffer  eve·~ more  than it need,  with more 
jobo going by the board than if action \·lere  taken in time. 
We  must  bend  our every effort to prevent  such a  worsening of 
unemployment • 
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